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ACTION-FORCING UNDER NEPA: BEYOND THE
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
JAMES M. PHIPPS*
The National Environmental Policy Act of 19691 (NEPA) was enact-
ed in response to the growing awareness that man cannot continue to
exploit the earth's physical resources in ignorance of "the profound
impact of [his] activity on . . . the natural environment." '2 Realizing
that most individuals work toward their own social or economic ends
unmindful of the cumulative impact of their actions, 3 Congress passed
a full disclosure law designed to apprise the public of the seriousness
of the problem and introduce environmental information into federal
decision-making. 4 To effectuate these goals and minimize conflicting
* B.S., Stanford University, 1973; J.D., Washington University, 1977.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). For a general discussion of NEPA,
see F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COuRTs: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL EN-
VIRONMENTAL POLICY ACr (1973).
2. NEPA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(a) (1970) begins:
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the interrela-
tions of all components of the natural environment, particularly the profound
influences of population growth, high density urbanization, industrial expansion,
resource exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances and recog-
nizing further the critical importance of restoring and maintaining environmental
quality to the overall welfare and development of man ...
The Senate Committee also stated that Congress was concerned because "the evidence
of environmental mismanagement is accumulating at an ever-increasing rate as a result
of population growth, increased pressures on a finite resource base, and advancing
technological developments which have enlarged man's capacity to effectuate environ-
mental change." S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1969) (hereinafter cited as
Senate Report).
3. Senate Report, supra note 2, at 9. The committee believed that the principal cause
of the threat to our environment was the unintentional and unanticipated consequences
of the single-minded pursuit of "more immediate goals" and inadequate consideration of
those consequences of which the actor is aware. Id.
4. H.R. REP. No. 91-378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3-8 (1969) (hereinafter cited as House
Report); Senate Report, supra note 2, at 4-6, 14. Both the Senate and the House felt
there was a need for "public enlightenment" as to environmental issues. Two positive
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federal activities,5 Congress added a series of action-forcing provi-
sions, 6 contained in section 102(2) of NEPA, which require the federal
government and its agencies to carefully evaluate the environmental
consequences of all proposed federal actions.
7
Because the courts and the Council on Environmental Quality 8
(CEQ) generally defer to agency expertise on substantive decisions 9 it
is through private challenges to an agency's compliance with the pro-
cedural requirements of section 102(2) that implementation of the
Act's policies may be ensured. Procedural challenges have primarily
focused on the absence or inadequacy of the environmental impact
statement (EIS) required by subparagraph 102(2)(C).1 0 Review under
benefits were expected. First, those in authority, either Congress, the President or
agency heads, would then be in a position to resolve conflicting policies and goals, and,
second, the public, once aware of the seriousness of the problem, would be willing to
take steps to improve the situation.
5. House Report, supra note 4, at 3-4; Senate Report, supra note 2, at 8. Surprisingly,
one expected result was to increase public confidence in agencies. Id.
6. Senate Report, supra note 2, at 12; Hearings on S. 1075, S. 237and S. 1752 Before
Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 206 (1969); 115
CONG. REC. (Part 30) 40416 (1969).
7. NEPA §§ 101-102, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-32 (1970).
8. NEPA § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1970).
9. Once an agency has complied with NEPA's procedural directives, courts may only
review whether the agency has taken a "hard look" at environmental consequences-
not whether the specific choice of action is wise or appropriate. Kleppe v. Sierra Club,
427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976).
The CEQ will not review agency decisions. Instead the CEQ limits its duties to
disseminating environmental information to the public, and state and local governments,
promulgating guidelines for agency regulations, and providing Congress and the Presi-
dent with an environmental progress report on agency implementation of NEPA. See
NEPA § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1970); House Report, supra note 4, at 2760-61; notes
70-76 and accompanying text infra.
10. Of the approximately 700 reported decisions, only a very small percentage men-
tion any action-forcing provision other than subparagraph 102(2)(C)'s impact statement
requirement. Those cases which do refer to other subparagraphs of section 102(2),
usually do so in conjunction with subparagraph 102(2)(C). For example, in Save Our
Invaluable Land v. Needham, 10 E.R.C. 1610 (10th Cir. [no date given]), the Tenth
Circuit stated:
Sections (A) and (B) are, in a sense, declarations of policy, and to effectuate such
policies, Section (C) requires that an environmental impact statement be filed on all
major federal actions, and lists five specific matters to be covered in such state-
ment. Section (C) is apparently designed to make certain that there be compliance
with the statement of policy announced in Sections (A) and (B).
Id. at 1613. Less than 10 cases are based upon a subparagraph of section 102(2)
independent of subparagraph 102(2)(C) entirely.
As noted by the Supreme Court in a footnote to Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390
(1976), a court may enter the agency review process under subparagraph 102(2)(C) when
"someone protests either the absence or the adequacy of the final impact statement."
Id. at 406 n.15.
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that section, however, has become more difficult due to judicial in-
terpretations limiting the effectiveness and applicability of subparag-
raph 102(2)(C). 1"
Whenever agencies are excused from preparation of a complete EIS,
it is likely that many of the policies established by NEPA will not be
fully implemented.' 2 Additional duties are imposed on agencies under
the remaining subparagraphs of section 102(2). Regardless of any limi-
tations on review the courts read into subparagraph 102(2)(C), agency
compliance may still be effectively challenged under subparagraphs
102(2)(A), (B), (D) and (G), independent of subparagraph 102(2)(C), 13
thereby safeguarding the essential policies of the Act.
This Note will review the limitations under subparagraph 102(2)(C)
that courts have imposed and will conduct a section-by-section analy-
sis of the remaining action-forcing provisions of section 102(2). These
provisions should allow development of alternative litigation strategies
that may be used to promote full consideration and implementation of
NEPA's policies in federal decision-making.
I. LIMITATIONS ON SUBPARAGRAPH 102(2)(C) REQUIREMENTS
Subparagraph 102(2)(C) provides in pertinent part:
(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall-
C) "include in every recommendation or report on propo-
sals for legislation and other major Federal actions signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a
detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
irior to making any detailed statement, the responsible
Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments
of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or
special expertise with respect to any environmental impact
involved .... 14
11. See notes 15-42 and accompanying text infra.
12. See notes 165-68 and accompanying text infra.
13. For a discussion of the duties imposed by section 102(2) of NEPA, see notes 43-
164 and accompanying text infra. For authority on the independence of various sub-
paragraphs of section 102(2), see note 45 and accompanying text infra.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
NEPA
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A number of threshold decisions required by the subparagraph limit
the application of the EIS requirement. No impact statement is re-
quired unless the proposed action is major and federal and "signifi-
cantly affects the quality of the human environment.' ' 15 Although
agencies are required to prepare a "negative declaration"' 6 detailing
the reasons for a threshold decision that an EIS is not required, 7
significant environmental impacts may still be overlooked. If the agen-
cy determines a proposal is neither major nor federal, impacts may
never be discovered and properly evaluated. If the agency has deter-
mined that the environmental impact is not significant, new environ-
mental impacts may escape detection and new environmental research
which could be used by the public or other governmental agencies is
left undone. Furthermore, subparagraph 102(2)(C) does not require a
continuing reevaluation of the agency's threshold determination. Thus
if changes occur in the program, there is no assurance that the agency
will apprehend any increased or newly created impacts.
Although not directly limiting the application of subparagraph
102(2)(C), the Supreme Court recently construed the timing of the EIS
requirement and limited the extent to which environmental factors are
considered in the early stages of the decision-making process. Under
the Court's holding in Kleppe v. Sierra Club'18 compliance with sub-
paragraph 102(2)(C) cannot be challenged until the time when the Act
requires an EIS be filed, that being when the agency makes its "recom-
mendation or report." 19 As a result, an action based on 102(2)(C) can
no longer be used to ensure that agencies are considering environmen-
tal impacts prior to decision-making rather than preparing an EIS as a
post hoc justification for their substantive decision. An agency may
thus commit significant resources, time and manpower to a project
before it undertakes preparation of an EIS. The magnitude of the
investment undermines any benefit the agency's eventual balancing of
interests would have achieved.
15. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). See McGarity, The Courts, The
Agencies, and NEPA Threshold Issues, 55 TEx. L. REV. 801 (1977).
16. See, e.g., Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908
(1972); CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.7(e) (1976).
17. See, e.g., Simmans v. Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5, 12-13 (S.D. Tex. 1974); F. ANDER-
SON, NEPA IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY AcT 56-105 (1973).
18. 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
19. Id. at 405-06.
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Courts have also created some exceptions to the 102(2)(C) EIS
requirement. Justification for the judicially imposed limitations arise
out of considerations of convenience, 20 practicality2' and even notions
of "national security."'22 As long as these exceptions are read and
applied narrowly, perhaps the vitality of 102(2)(C) will be unimpaired.
It is the danger of their broader applications, however, which increases
the significance of the exceptions. The first exemption from NEPA's
EIS requirement appeared in Portland Cement Association v. Ruckel-
shaus.- In that case the District of Columbia Circuit held that EPA
was exempt from preparing an EIS when promulgating new source
performance standards under section 111 of the Clean Air Act.24 The
court reasoned that the rule-making procedures followed by EPA in
setting the standards were the functional equivalent of an EIS.25 The
court believed that because EPA's sole function is to protect environ-
mental values,2 6 the duties imposed under the Clear Air Act struck "a
workable balance between some of the advantages and some of the
disadvantages of full application of NEPA." 27 The "disadvantages of
full application" of the EIS requirement apparently include the costs
and delays arising from litigation and duplication of efforts. Any exten-
sion of this doctrine beyond the narrow limits set in this case would be
an unwarranted exception to NEPA. 28
20. Portland Cement Assoc. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See notes
23-28 and accompanying text infra.
21. See Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776 (1976) (impractical
to prepare an EIS within 30 days); Redding v. Morton, 6 E.R.C. 1887 (D.C. Mont. 1974)
(requiring EIS on mineral leases at time prospecting permits issued not justified because
the expense would prevent any decision, not insure a better informed one).
22. Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Committee
for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 796, 798-99 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
23. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974). See also Indiana
& Michigan Electric Co. v. EPA, 509 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1975); Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA,
501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Essex Chemical Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1973); Buckeye Power, Inc. v.
EPA, 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973); Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973);
International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1973); Appalachian
Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973).
24. 486 F.2d at 383-87.
25. Id. at 386.
26. Id. at 386 n.42.
27. Id. at 386.
28. The D.C. Circuit in Portland Cement emphasized that functional equivalence was
a very narrow exception and that "NEPA must be accorded full vitality as to non-
environmental agencies." Id. at 387. Claims by agencies other than EPA have been
NEPA
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Another example of judicial concern with delays caused by 102(2)(C)
compliance occurs in Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers
Association.29 The Supreme Court found a conflict between a statu-
tory deadline on agency action and the inherent delay caused by
preparation of an impact statement. 30 Under the Interstate Land Sales
Full Disclosure Act,3' HUD is required to review registration of land to
be sold in interstate commerce. Registration is automatically effective
after thirty days unless HUD finds the registration is false and mislead-
ing on its face.32 Since it is impractical for an agency to prepare a
complete impact statement within thirty days, the Court held that
HUD was not required to file an EIS. 33 Thus whenever a statutory
deadline expediting agency action is set,34 subparagraph 102(2)(C)
cannot be used to ensure that an agency has taken all environmental
factors into account. In addition, no environmental information con-
cerning land development is disseminated to interested federal and
state agencies and members of the public.
NEPA's action-forcing provisions require agencies to comply "to
the fullest extent possible." '35 An agency working under a statutory
deadline presumably could be required to prepare as complete an
impact statement as possible within the time allowed. 36 In Scenic
made and rejected. For example, in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 388
F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 913 (1976), the court held that the
Bureau of Land Management was not excused from the impact statement requirement
when granting grazing leases under the Taylor Grazing Act because that Act was not
purely environmental. The Bureau was also required to promote stabilization of the
livestock industry. Id. at 833. However, this case indicates that any agency with direct
environmental duties may argue that the doctrine should apply.
29. 426 U.S. 776 (1976). See 13 URBAN L. ANN. 225 (1977).
30. 426 U.S. at 791.
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1970).
32. Id. at § 1706.
33. 426 U.S. at 791; contra, Natural Resources Defense Counsel v. SEC, 389 F.
Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1974).
34. 426 U.S. at 791.
35. NEPA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The phrase mandates
agency compliance with NEPA unless prohibited from doing so by its statutory authori-
zation. See CONF. REP. ON S. 1075, H.R. REP. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969).
36. A similar situation occurred in Environmental Defense Fund v. Adams, 10 E.R.C.
1317 (D.D.C. 1977), where the agency had only six months in which to prepare the
impact statement. The district court acknowledged that "[e]nvironmental impact state-
ments often take a good deal longer than this to prepare fully. . . .Therefore the
Secretary may [very] well have to compromise somewhat on the completeness of the
impact statement in order to have the revision published by January of next year." Id. at
1320. See also Louisiana v. FPC, 503 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1974) (agency only required to
prepare the best EIS possible under the circumstances).
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Rivers, however, instead of reducing the thoroughness of the EIS, the
Court eliminated the need for an EIS altogether. This new standard of
impracticality may be applied to many situations other than time dead-
lines.
A significant 102(2)(C) exception has been created to cover emergen-
cy or temporary agency actions and their attendant time constraints.3 7
In most emergency situations, the agency must act quickly if it acts at
all. This duty to act conflicts with the time delay caused when com-
pliance with NEPA is required. Under these circumstances, courts
have held that Congress did not intend NEPA to apply. 38 Although this
may accord with both the statute and its legislative history, it is
justified only to the extent that the emergency situation postpones
preparation of an impact statement.39 Even so consideration of en-
vironmental impacts should be undertaken at the earliest opportunity
because excusing even a temporary action from NEPA's requirements
results in some quantum of environmental protection being irretriev-
ably lost.'
37. This exception is more significant because it applies to any agency regardless of
whether it is already required to consider environmental factors. Thus, if this exception
is applied, there is no guarantee that any environmental impacts will be evaluated by the
agency.
38. See Milo Community Hosp. v. Weinberger, 525 F.2d 144 (1st Cir. 1975) (termi-
nation of status as provider of services under Social Security Act for non-compliance
with federal fire safety rules); Louisiana v. FPC, 503 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1974) (EIS must
be filed by FPC when it promulgates a final gas curtailment plan pursuant to the Natural
Gas Act although no EIS would be necessary if it were only the interim order); Gulf Oil
v. Simon, 502 F.2d 1154 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974) (temporary allocations of crude oil
and petroleum products under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act); Dry Color
Manufacturers' Ass'n v. Dep't of Labor, 486 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1973) (no EIS required for
promulgation of emergency temporary standards under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act); Atlanta Gas & Light v. FPC, 476 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1973) (no EIS is
necessary for interim suspension orders under the Natural Gas Act).
39. NEPA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 4335 (1970), states that "[t]he policies and goals set
forth in this chapter are supplementary to those set forth in existing authorizations of
Federal agencies." The Conference Committee Report stated that this section meant
that federal agencies must comply with NEPA "unless to do so would clearly violate
their existing statutory authorizations." CONF. REP. ON S. 1075, H.R. REP. No. 91-765,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969). If a statute is interpreted to impose an absolute duty to act
within a set time and the purpose behind the agency's primary obligation would be
disrupted by undue delay, then the statutory conflict would be clear. In emergency
situations, speedy action is a necessity and a statutory conflict is fairly clear, although
based upon practical considerations. However, in these instances the Congress balanced
the policies behind both laws and decided immediate safety was most important, espe-
cially since NEPA would be complied with eventually.
40. For example, an agency might be able to mitigate or avoid adverse environmental
consequences of the temporary action. In addition, if the agency begins collecting and
assessing environmental data at an early point in the decision-making process, it will
1977]
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Courts have held that an EIS is not required in other situations.
Preparation of an impact statement prior to approval of prospecting
permits was excused where it would allegedly entail such a massive
effort that it would prevent any decision rather than assure a better-
informed decision.4' Similarly, despite serious doubts as to the adequa-
cy of an impact statement, an underground nuclear explosion was
allowed, based on considerations of national security.42
Although the 102(2)(C) exceptions show no signs of entirely
eliminating the EIS requirement, an opportunity to advance at least
some goals of the Act is lost whenever action is taken free from the
subparagraph's requirements. It is therefore important to develop
other strategies to challenge agency procedure under section 102(2).
II. INDEPENDENT USE OF ACTION-FORCING PROVISIONS
The action-forcing provisions of section 102(2) have often been read
as a unit.43 Under this view, 102(2)(C) is seen as providing a written
record that the methodologies established in the other subparagraphs
have been complied with.44 Such a constricted reading of the statute is
not warranted. The EIS is not the only means of checking agency
compliance with NEPA's procedural mandates. Implicit in many court
opinions is the assumption that an independent cause of action can be
based upon any of the subparagraphs of section 102(2). 45 Only a small
have more information available when the final agency decision is made and that same
information will be available for use by other agencies at an earlier point in time.
41. Redding v. Morton, 6 E.R.C. 1887 (D.C. Mont. 1974).
42. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.
1971). The court felt that the potential harm to normal security and foreign policy
resulting from any delay outweighed the policies established by NEPA. Id. at 798.
43. See, e.g., Save Our Invaluable Land v. Needham, 10 E.R.C. 1610, 1613 (10th Cir.
[no date given]); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 492 F.2d
1123, 1131-32 (5th Cir. 1974).
44. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 492 F.2d 1123,
1131-32 (5th Cir. 1974).
45. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, 539 F.2d 824, 842 (2d Cir.
1976) (stating that subparagraph 102(2)(D) must be complied with "even if no formal
impact statement is filed"); Milo Community Hosp. v. Weinberger, 525 F.2d 144 (lst
Cir. 1975) (court rejected claim based on subparagraphs 102(2)(A), (B) & (D) because not
supported by either the complaint or the evidence); Natural Resources Defense Council
v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 93 (2d Cir. 1975) (stating that subparagraph 102(2)(D) is
"independent of and of wider scope than the [EIS requirement]"); Trinity Episcopal
School Corp. v. Romney, 523 F.2d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1975) (stating that subparagraph 102(2)
(D) is independent of the EIS requirement); Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) (stating
that subparagraphs 102(2)(A) & (D) must be complied with prior to the impact statement
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number of cases have analyzed the functions of the subparagraphs of
section 102(2) other than subparagraph 102(2)(C). Although courts
attempted to develop them into viable enforcement devices shortly
after NEPA was enacted, emphasis quickly shifted to enforcement of
the EIS alone. Only recently has a trend toward renewed use of the
neglected subparagraphs become discernible.
A. Subparagraph 102(2)(A)-A Systematic
Interdisciplinary Approach
Subparagraph 102(2)(A) provides:
(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall-
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which
will insure the integrated use of the natural and social
under subparagraph 102(2)(C)); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs,
492 F.2d 1123, 1135 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating that the requirements of subparagraph
102(2)(D) are more extensive than those contained in subparagraph 102(2)(C)); First
National Bank of Chicago v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369 (7th Cir. 1973) (court considered
challenge under section 102(2) and held that subparagraphs 102(2)(A) & (D) were com-
plied with and subparagraphs 102(2)(B) & (C) were inapplicable); Hanly v. Kleindienst,
471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973) (holding agency's negative
declaration must comply with subparagraphs 102(2)(A), (B) & (D) even though subparag-
raph 102(2)(C) might not apply); Mid-Shiawassee County Concerned Citizens v. Train,
408 F. Supp. 650 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (holding that negative assessment must reflect a
systematic, interdisciplinary approach); McDowell v. Schlesinger, 404 F. Supp. 221, 251-
52 (W.D. Mo. 1975) (holding that subparagraph 102(2)(A) was violated and that the
subparagraph applies regardless of subparagraph 102(2)(C)'s applicability); Illinois v.
Butterfield, 396 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. I11. 1975) (holding that complaint stated a cause of
action when based solely upon subparagraphs 102(2)(A), (B), & (D)); Simmans v. Grant,
370 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (negative statement must be prepared so that courts can
review for agency compliance with subparagraphs 102(2)(A), (B) & (D)).
Two methods have been used to review agency procedures without challenging the
preparation or adequacy of the EIS. In Simmans v. Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Tex.
1974), the court held a hearing in order to review agency compliance with subparagraphs
102(2)(A), (B) & (D). Id. at 18. The agency had already determined that subparagraph
102(2)(C) was inapplicable. Thus the basic issue was whether the agency had utilized
subparagraph 102(2)(A), (B) & (D) procedures in making that determination. Id. at 17-19.
Therefore, a hearing may be used during which the agency must describe the approach
and consideration it is giving to a particular problem. The court must then judge whether
the approach adopted fulfills the required analysis under NEPA. Second, courts have
imposed an affirmative duty on agencies to develop a reviewable record whenever they
determine that an EIS is unnecessary, see, e.g., Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823,835
(2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 649 (2d
Cir. 1972), so that the court can determine whether the agencies' determination was
arbitrary or unreasonable. A similar record could be required so that a court can
determine whether NEPA procedures have been followed. This would save the time
required for a hearing and only slightly increase the burden on agencies who generally
are required to keep extensive records of their activities. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW § 605 (1972). Where an agency's own regulations require such record be maintained,
then a court can use this record to judge whether the agency has complied with NEPA.
See, e.g., Simmans v. Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5, 17-18 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
NEPA
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sciences and the environmental design arts in planning and
in decisionmaking which may have an impact on man's
environment.46
To ensure that no environmental impacts of agency action are over-
looked,47 102(2)(A) requires a sponsoring agency to use a systematic
and interdisciplinary approach in reaching decisions. Although some
courts refuse to find a violation because this requirement is "some-
what opaque," 48 other courts have interpreted the subparagraph to
impose concrete demands on agencies. 49
In order to effectuate the general policy that environmental research
direct agency planning, not substantiate it, two early district court
cases held that "the completion of an adequate research program [is] a
prerequisite to agency action.'"50 This burden will be met if the agency
undertakes a diligent, good faith effort "which utilizes effective
methods and reflects the current state of the art of relevant scientific
disciplines." 51 Although less stringent standards have been applied, 52 it
is clear that a mere "bald conclusion reached after perfunctory and
superficial analysis of clearly inadequate data" is inadequate.53 Data
46. NEPA § 102(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A) (1970).
47. Inman Park Restoration v. Urban Mass Transp. Admin., 414 F. Supp. 99, 120
(N.D. Ga. 1976) ("to the extent that the project will have adverse impact, it will not have
been inadvertently authorized, but knowingly authorized"); Mid-Shiawassee County
Concerned Citizens v. Train, 408 F. Supp. 650, 656 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (a systematic,
interdisciplinary approach insures that, "in deciding not to require an impact statement,
no significant environmental factor is overlooked."); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F.
Supp. 1289, 1347 (S.D. Tex. 1973) ("the reason underlying this approach is to ensure that
some significant impact does not go undiscovered until too late, merely because the
sponsoring agency was unaware of potential problems which the reviewing agency might
suspect.").
48. Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 834 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
49. See notes 50-67 infra and cases cited therein.
50. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant, 355 F. Supp. 280, 289 (E.D.N.C.
1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401, 1403 (D.D.C. 1971).
51. Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401, 1403 (D.D.C. 1971);
accord, Westside Property Owners v. Schlesinger, 10 E.R.C. 1570, 1572 (D.C. Ariz.
1976).
52. If agency studies show a project was not "inadvertently authorized, but knowing-
ly authorized," Inman Park Restoration v. Urban Mass Transp. Admin., 414 F. Supp.
99, 120 (N.D. Ga. 1976), or, even further, that "each alternative was explored from
environmental, social or aesthetic perspectives," Mid-Shiawassee County Concerned
Citizens v. Train, 408 F. Supp. 650, 659 (E.D. Mich. 1976), then subparagraph 102(2)(A)
has been held satisfied.
53. McDowell v. Schlesinger, 404 F. Supp. 221, 251 (W.D. Mo. 1975). In Hanly v.
Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), the Second Circuit held that the Government
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available to the agency is adequate if it allows the agency to give
thoughtful and reasoned consideration to all potential environmental
effects.54 If such data is unavailable, it should be clear that an agency
must initiate research and investigation before it may go forward on a
project, including outside consultation in areas beyond the agency's
expertise.55
Such an approach ensures that no environmental issue or relevant
information is overlooked merely because the agency lacks the present
expertise to suspect a problem exists. For example, in McDowell v.
Schlesinger56 an Army officer specializing in industrial health deter-
mined that the relocation of certain Army personnel would have no
significant impact. 57 The district court held that an interdisciplinary
approach required that experts in other disciplines be consulted. 58
Services Administration had complied with subparagraph 102(2) (A) while building a
Metropolitan Civic Center since they had retained an architect and their negative decla-
ration 'scrupulously [took] into account the aesthetic and tangible factors involved in
the designing and planning" of the Civic Center. Id. at 835. Although this case only
stands for the idea that scrupulous consideration of environmental factors is sufficient,
not required, it is clear that the court expected a diligent investigation by the agency.
In Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976), plaintiffs claimed that HUD violated subparagraph
102(2)(A) because HUD failed to read a study on social problems in public housing which
dealt with the area HUD was contemplating as a housing site. Id. at 232. The Seventh
Circuit held that an agency need not "consider all documents possibly relevant to a given
environmental issue" so long as they gave good faith consideration to the impact of the
project on the social environment of the neighborhood. Id.
In Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1975), plaintiffs had challenged
Department of Interior's action granting offshore oil leases before completing a detailed
study on the hazards to geologic conditions of the ocean floor. Id. at 827. The Fifth
Circuit held that since the leases were short term and gave the agency a continuing ability
to control and adjust future actions, it was not unreasonable for the agency to grant the
leases without finishing the study. Id. at 827-28. A strong inference is that in the absence
of such continuing control, the completion of the study would have been mandatory
under 102(2)(A). Even stronger, the court's opinion assumes that the study will be
completed subsequent to the EIS in the event it is not completed beforehand.
54. McDowell v. Schlesinger, 404 F. Supp. 221, 251-52 (W.D. Mo. 1975) (Data must
be sufficient to give agency the "opportunity to identify all areas of potential environ-
mental impact, or to give these areas the informed 'hard look' that is required .. "
The agency must have given "thoughtful and reasoned consideration to all potential
environmental effects of the proposed action."); Simmans v. Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5, 19
(S.D. Tex. 1974) (Purpose of subparagraph is to "ensure an intelligent assessment of the
'significance' of the project's environmental impacts.").
55. This is the express requirement of subparagraph 102(2)(G). See notes 156-64 and
accompanying text infra.
56. 404 F. Supp. 221 (W.D. Mo. 1975).
57. Id. at 251-52.
58. Id.
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Likewise in Simmans v. Grant,59 the Soil Conservation Service was
found to have failed to use an interdisciplinary approach in deciding
whether a water conservation project would have a significant impact
because it did not consult other agencies having expertise over water-
way and stream modification.' The court reasoned that such consulta-
tion is necessary "to ensure an intelligent assessment" by obtaining all
views of interested agencies and to ensure a "closer coordination
between engineering, economic and environmental experts.' '61
The broadest interpretation of this subparagraph to date was handed
down by the district court in Sierra Club v. Froehlke.62 The court
determined that the purpose of the requirement was "to alert the
sponsoring officials as to the studies or inquiries that need to be made"
and thus ensure that no impact goes undiscovered "merely because the
sponsoring agency was unaware of potential problems." 63 To fully
effectuate this purpose, the court held that not only must the sponsor-
ing agency seek out and contact appropriate authorities, but other
federal agencies must check the Federal Register regularly to ensure
that no activity which falls within their area of competence will be
authorized unless they have issued some opinion as to its environmen-
59. 370 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
60. Id. at 18-19.
61. Id. at 19-20. A narrower interpretation was made by the Seventh Circuit in
Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975). The court
held that subparagraph 102(2)(A) was satisfied if HUD in good faith considered the
impact of the housing project on the social environment of the surrounding area. Id. at
232. In so holding the court rejected a claim that HUD should have consulted a
sociologist. Id. The interdisciplinary requirement was limited to mean that a problem
must be looked at from the'perspective of a variety of disciplines, not that outside
experts must be consulted if the agency lacks expertise in the particular area. The court
felt it was limited on what it could require because the local housing authority was
already under a court order to construct housing. Id. Thus, the opinion should not be
read as standing for the proposition that subparagraph 102(2)(A) never requires that
outside agencies or experts in relevant disciplines be consulted.
62. 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
63. Id. at 1347, 1349. While the court based its entire discussion on language con-
tained in subparagraph 102(2)(C)-"consult with and obtain the comments of any Feder-
al agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environ-
mental impact involved--" the court based its conclusion as to what is required by this
language on the fact that "NEPA obligates sponsoring agencies to use a systematic,
interdisciplinary approach." Id. at 1346. This is language from subparagraph 102(2)(A).
Once the independent use of subparagraph 102(2)(A) is accepted, it is clear the mandate
of this subparagraph does not change whether an impact statement is required or not. No
real reliance was placed upon the subparagraph 102(2)(C) language other than to show
that an EIS when used, must also show that the other section 102(2) procedures have
been followed.
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tal consequences.' 4 The court also held that the sponsoring agency
must defer to the analysis given by the agency "best equipped to
render an expert opinion." 65 The sponsoring agency may adopt its own
evaluation only if it produces clear and convincing evidence that the
reviewing agency was incorrect and gives that agency an opportunity
to modify its evaluation.6 The court had two reasons for establishing
this rule. First, it would not make sense to force a sponsoring agency to
consult with other agencies and experts and then allow the sponsoring
agency to ignore the advice that is given.67 Second, the rule fits the
court's perception of the statutory scheme that "Congress intended to
provide a form of environmental 'checks- and balances' with which
federal agencies might complement one another and thereby keep the
ship of state, as unwieldy as it often is, on a more steady course as
'trustee of the environment for succeeding generations.' "68
In conducting a systematic and interdisciplinary study of potential
environmental impacts, perfection in gathering information is not re-
quired and hypercritical complaints will not be accepted by a reviewing
court.69 However, if the purpose of the study is to uncover all known
and unknown impacts, then characterizing a study as hypercritical or
unreasonable assumes that no useful or vital knowledge will be dis-
covered. The threshold decision itself is thus only a bald conclusion. A
study should be dismissed only if it is not relevant to the particular
project or is cumulative and repetitive.
Ideally, an agency will have examined all possible impacts of their
action, if only to determine that a particular impact will not be signifi-
cant. If no consideration is given to an environmental issue which
could conceivably be raised by a project, then an action should lie
against the agency unless it undertakes some preliminary investigation
to determine whether a measurable impact will occur. If the agency
acknowledges the relevance of an environmental issue, then an action
may lie if the complaint shows that data is insufficient to adequately
evaluate or mitigate adverse environmental effects, or that the infor-
mation exists but is not being considered by the agency. No statutory
language limits the time when such a challenge may be brought. Since
64. Id. at 1346-47.
65. Id. at 1347-49.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1349.
69. Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975).
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courts do not like to infringe upon agency decision-making, however,
complaints based on omissions in the agency's systematic, interdiscip-
linary approach should only be brought after the agency has refused to
act on suggestions made by complainants.
Given our incomplete understanding of the total impact of our ac-
tivities on the environment, any questions of relevance should be
resolved in favor of inclusion in a study. Nothing is lost by requiring
research the first time an environmental issue is confronted. While the
burden on an agency acting in a new and inadequately researched area
is great, once information on various impacts is developed, the burden
on subsequent agency studies will be minimized. This forced pooling
of knowledge and expertise of many agencies accelerates NEPA's
goals and prevents repetitious research.
B. Subparagraph 102(2)(B)-Consideration of Unquantified
Environmental Values and Amenities
Subparagraph 102(2)(B) provides:
(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall-
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in con-
sultation with the Council on Environmental Quality .. ,
which will insure that presently unquantified environmen-
tal amenities and values may be given appropriate con-
sideration in decisionmaking along with economic and
technical considerations. 70
1. Deference to CEQ Regulations
CEQ first interpreted this subparagraph together with section 10371
to place "primary responsibility upon each individual federal agency to
prepare its own NEPA procedures," 72 and published general guidelines
for agencies preparing impact statement regulations.73 Although the
70. NEPA § 102(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (1970).
71. NEPA § 103, 42 U.S.C. § 4333 (1970).
72. CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) (1976); e.g., Movement Against Destruc-
tion v. Volpe, 361 F. Supp. 1360, 1382 (D. Md. 1973).
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. S.E.C., 10 ERC 1026 (D.D.C. 1977), the
district court found that the S.E.C. had violated subparagraph 102(2)(B) for "failure to
make a serious effort to develop appropriate guidelines and standards for disclosure of
environmental information" in proxy statements and federal securities registration state-
ments. Id. at 1037.
73. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500 (1976).
[Vol. 14:137
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol14/iss1/7
NEPA
guidelines are only advisory, the courts have stated that CEQ interpre-
tations of NEPA are entitled to great weight and deference. 74
The language, "in conjunction with the [CEQ]," clearly requires
more than just preparation of agency guidelines by CEQ.75 If an agency
fails to consult CEQ in preparing its own procedures, it has violated
subparagraph 102(2)(B). In addition, the subparagraph can be read to
require not only consultation with CEQ but acquiescence to CEQ
advice because CEQ was intended to be the best informed agency on
environmental matters. This interpretation corresponds to a similar
theory used under subparagraph 102(2)(A). 76
2. Quantification
In Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. AEC,77 the District of
Columbia Circuit stated that 102(B) requires a "rather finely tuned and
systematic balancing" of costs and benefits to "ensure that . . the
optimally beneficial action is finally taken." 8 This includes the possi-
bility of abandoning the project.79 Although the court does not state
how complete the assessment of environmental costs must be, a "fine-
ly tuned" analysis implies more than subjective consideration of en-
vironmental impacts.
Precise formulas reducing environmental amenities to mathematical
absolutes are not required, 80 but agencies must "search out, develop
74. Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 421 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 849 (1972); see Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 417 U.S. 1301, 1310
(1974); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164, 1178 (6th Cir. 1972).
75. See, e.g., NEPA § 102(2)(I), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(I) (Supp. IV 1975), amending, 42
U.S.C. 4332(2)(H) (1976); NEPA § 204, 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (1970); House Report, supra
note 4, at 5-6.
76. See notes 60-66 and accompanying text supra. Thus instead of modifying their
guidelines solely to incorporate judicial interpretations that expand NEPA, the CEQ
could interpret NEPA directly and introduce new methods and procedures as they
become feasible. This would increase coordination among agencies and shift the burden
to the agencies to prove that the CEQ interpretation is not within the law.
77. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
78. Id. at 1113, 1123. Senator Jackson, discussing the balancing required by 102(B)
stated: "Subsection 102(B) requires the development of procedures designed to ensure
that all relevant environmental values and amenities are considered in the calculus of
project development and decisionmaking." 115 CONG. REC. 29055 (1969) (statement of
Senator Jackson).
79. 449 F.2d at 1123.
80. Robinson v. Knebel, 10 E.R.C. 1097, 1100 (8th Cir. 1977) (Subparagraph 102(2)(B)
does not require "specific assignment of dollar value to environmental factors, which
are frequently not amenable to quantification, . . . if the impact statement otherwise
1977]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
and follow procedures reasonably calculated to bring environmental
factors to peer status with dollars and technology."81 This view is
justified for practical reasons. To postpone all agency action pursuant
to the development of precise mathematical formulas could prove
overly restrictive. 82 Reviewing courts, however, have demanded that
an agency know of deficiencies in its quantification techniques and
determine "whether any purpose would be served in delaying the
project while awaiting the development of such criteria.' '83
A weakness in this approach is that where an agency has been
confronted repeatedly with similar quantification problems, it is un-
reasonable to allow that agency to evade the duties imposed by
102(2)(B) by claiming that valuation techniques are unavailable. Where
it is shown that a problem has been seen in the past and will be
confronted again in the future, a good faith duty to develop formulas
for quantifying all environmental factors should be imposed.84
recognizes, discusses, and weighs the favorable and adverse effects of agency action.");
Daly v. Volpe, 514 F.2d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 1975) (A "'formal and mathematically
expressed cost benefit analysis' is not presently required by NEPA."); Sierra Club v.
Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 827 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[R]eduction to mathematical absolutes for
insertion into a precise formula" is not required.); Sierra Club v. Stamm, 507 F.2d 788,
794 (10th Cir. 1974) (NEPA does not require the "fixing of a dollar figure to either
environmental losses or benefits."); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of
Eng'rs, 492 F.2d 1123, 1133 (5th Cir. 1974) (Subparagraph 102(2)(B) "does not require
that every environmental amenity be reduced to an integer capable of insertion in a 'go-
no-go' equation."); Texas Comm'n on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 10 E.R.C. 1326,
1336 (E.D. Tex. 1977); Alabama v. Corps of Eng'rs, 411 F. Supp. 1261, 1268 (N.D. Ala.
1976); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 371 F. Supp. 1004, 1013 (E.D. Tenn.
1973); Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404, 414 (W.D. Va. 1973); Environ-
mental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 348 F. Supp. 916,928 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
81. Robinson v. Knebel, 10 E.R.C. 1097, 1100 (8th Cir. 1977); Cady v. Morton, 527
F.2d 786, 797 (9th Cir. 1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 827 (5th Cir. 1975);
Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1286 (9th Cir. 1974); Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502
F.2d 43, 61 (5th Cir. 1974); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 492
F.2d 1123, 1133 (5th Cir. 1974).
82. All agency activity would come to a standstill. Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786,796
(9th Cir. 1975); Jicarilla Appache Tribe v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275, 1280 (9th Cir. 1973);
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749, 758 (E.D. Ark.
1971), aff'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).
83. Jicarilla Appache Tribe v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275, 1280 (9th Cir. 1973); Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749,758 (E.D. Ark. 1971), aff'd,
470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).
84. For example, in 1971 this argument was made to the district court in Environmen-
tal Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749, 757-58 (E.D. Ark. 1971). Even
though the plaintiffs had presented evidence that it was possible to develop the neces-
sary criteria, the court held that subparagraph 102(2)(B) does not require an agency and
the CEQ to develop methods to quantify environmental factors. Id. A similar claim was
again rejected by the district court in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 371 F.
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3. Disclosure of Cost-Benefit Analysis
Where there is no available method for the precise valuation of
environmental amenities, disclosure of the values assigned to items in
the cost-benefit statement has been required. 85 The method used in
assigning values must be enumerated in sufficient detail to permit
reasoned evaluation by the decisionmaker and allow informed criti-
cism by challenging parties. 86 Mere "conclusory statements that the
benefit-cost ratio is justified" violates the subparagraph.17
An important issue under subparagraph 102(2)(B) is whether the
agency procedures "impinge upon environmental factors in such a way
as might dilute the emphasis to be given these amenities. "88 For exam-
ple, the agency cannot add environmental benefits such as recreation
into its cost benefit statement while leaving environmental costs un-
quantified. 89 Once challengers have shown that the calculations used
Supp. 1004, 1012-13 (E.D. Tenn. 1973). The argument was stronger because plaintiffs
asserted that the agency had had three and one-half years to develop methods, and
testimony indicated that the procedures would be similar to those developed to quantify
recreational benefits. Id. The court only reiterated that mathematical equivalence was
only necessary if a method already existed for its calculation. Id. Seven years after the
passage of NEPA, an agency's malfeasance should no longer be protected. If the rule of
reason is to control, the court should not concentrate on what is reasonably within the
agency's knowledge but what it could reasonably have leen expected to discover or
develop.
85. Robinson v. Knebel, 10 E.R.C. 1097, 1100 (8th Cir. 1977); Alabama v. Corps of
Eng'rs, 411 F. Supp. 1261, 1268 (N.D. Ala. 1976); Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F.
Supp. 404, 414 (W.D. Va. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., v. Corps of Eng'rs,
325 F. Supp. 749, 758 (E.D. Ark. 1971), aff'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).
86. Daly v. Volpe, 514 F.2d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 510
F.2d 813, 827 (5th Cir. 1975); Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1286 (9th Cir.
1974). However, most cases do not require a strict cost-benefit analysis. See note 80
supra.
87. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1366 (S.D. Tex. 1973); City
of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). Contra,
Robinson v. Knebel, 10 E.R.C. 1097, 1100 (8th Cir. 1977) (The court stated that "[w]hile
portions of the discussion are couched in conclusory terms that are less than ideal, we
cannot say that defendant did not adequately consider and weigh environmental factors
in reaching its ultimate decision.").
88. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1380 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
89. Id. Problems also arise when an agency uses unreasonably high or low valuation
rates, instead of current values, Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404, 416
(W.D. Va. 1973), out-of-date information, Alabama v. Corps of Eng'rs, 411 F. Supp.
1261, 1270 (N.D. Ala. 1976), or low interest rates while calculating present value. Less
clear is whether an agency could be forced to detail a range of possible cost-benefit ratios
whenever any environmental values are left unquantified in order to reduce undue
emphasis that might be attached if only a single ratio is provided.
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are unusual or inconsistent with prior agency practices, the burden
shifts to the agency to produce reasons for its valuations. 90
Thus a general scheme governing cost-benefit analysis under sub-
paragraph 102(2)(B) is discernible. Economic values must be assigned
to environmental factors if procedures exist for doing so. Otherwise,
both the deficiency and the costs and benefits used in the cost-benefit
statement must be pointed out. Lack of quantification may be chal-
lenged if plaintiff suggests a reasonable method for assigning a value.
Actual values assigned to environmental factors may be challenged if a
showing is made that the agency valuation might deemphasize environ-
mental amenities. The agency must then justify the figures or methods
it has chosen to use.
4. Public Notice and Hearing
A final issue under subparagraph 102(2)(B) is whether public notice
and hearing is required. In Hanly v. Kleindienst,91 plaintiffs claimed
that 102(2)(B) required the Government Services Administration to
hold public hearings before determining whether construction of a
lower Manhattan civic center and attached jail would have a significant
environmental impact. 92 The Second Circuit recognized that neither
statute nor administrative regulations required a hearing. 93 It held,
however, that a hearing may be necessary to ensure that all essential
and relevant information was before the agency. 94 The court added that
"the necessity for a hearing will depend greatly upon the circum-
stances surrounding the particular proposed action and upon the likli-
hood that a hearing will be more effective than other methods in
developing relevant information and an understanding of the proposed
action." 95 The precise procedural steps, i.e., a formal hearing or "in-
formal acceptance of relevant data," to be used was left to agency
discretion. 96
90. See, e.g., Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404 (W.D. Vir. 1973). In
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974),
however, the Fifth Circuit considered a claim that the Corps was required to articulate
the scale of values used by the agency to enable a reviewer to determine how the "trade-
off" was made by the agency. Id. at 1133. The court never answered this specific claim
but instead held that a good faith attempt to weight and weigh environmental values
satisfied subparagraph 102(2)(B). Id.
91. 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972).
92. Id. at 835-36.
93. Id. at 836.
94. Id. at 835-36.
95. Id. at 836.
96. Id..
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A number of courts have considered the need for a hearing. In
Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Kleindienst,97 the
court held that the absence of a hearing was not a procedural defect98
and distinguished Hanly v. Kleindienst on its facts: no local sen-
sibilities were affected since the detention center was not being built in
a residential neighborhood and the complaint was not that the impact
would be significant but that the plaintiffs wanted the fuller con-
sideration provided by the EIS. 99 Thus the significance of the impact
was not controversial. Only the decision to continue with the project
was found to be controversial. 100 In Simmans v. Grant,17" the court
held that the Soil Conservation Service failed to use appropriate
methods in not obtaining the opinions of affected citizens. 02 The
agency was engaged in a stream modification project and the relevant
information to be gained from a public hearing was "the project's
impact, if any, upon cattle raising and those persons dependent upon
this pursuit for their economic well-being in the affected area."' 13
The necessity for a public hearing under subparagraph 102(2)(B)
depends upon potential environmental impacts of the proposed project
and whether a hearing would produce information relevant to those
impacts. Whenever the agency must take into account the impact of
the project on affected citizens, the public is then an essential source
of information on how they will be affected. Because CEQ Guidelines
require an EIS whenever the significance of a project's impact is
controversial,' °4 public participation is necessary to determine whether
the magnitude of the impact is controverted or the agency has under-
rated concerns over impacts of known magnitudes. Note, however,
97. 382 F. Supp. 107 (N.D. 111. 1973).
98. Id. at 113-14.
99. Id.
100. Id. See also CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.7(d) (1976).
101. 370 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
102. Id. at 19. The court also thought a hearing would be beneficial because it allowed
the public an opportunity to review and understand the project. Id.
103. Id.
104. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part that "[proposed major
actions, the environmental impact of which is likely to be highly controversial, should be
covered in all cases." Controversial, as used in the guidelines, means a dispute over the
significance of the impact, not the popularity of the project itself. However, if a
secondary impact of an unpopular project would be to cause a change in the makeup of
the surrounding community, then the fact of unpopularity is information relevant to the
agency's determination.
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that if agency regulations call for public hearings, there is no need to
establish that relevant information would be developed.
C. Subparagraph 102(2)(D)-Study, Development and Description of
Appropriate Alternatives
Subparagraph 102(2)(D) provides:
(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall-
(D) study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives
to recommended courses of action in any proposal which
involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses
of available resources. 10 5
Although subparagraph 102(2)(C) requires a detailed statement on
"alternatives to the proposed action,"'06 courts have recognized that
subparagraph 102(2)(D) imposes further duties on agencies with re-
spect to consideration of alternatives.'17 These duties may be satisfied
in part by the discussion of alternatives in the agency's EIS. 108 Indeed,
compliance with subparagraph 102(2)(D) is often based solely on an
examination of the EIS. The subparagrqph is independent of the EIS
105. NEPA § 102(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(D) (1970). NEPA was amended in 1975 to
insert a subparagraph allowing responsibility for preparation of the EIS to be delegated
to state officials upon certain specified conditions. This subparagraph was inserted as
subparagraph 102(2)(D) and the remaining subparagraphs, 102(2)(D)-(H), were shifted
down a letter. For the purposes of this Note, however, I have chosen to continue to refer
to the subparagraphs by their original lettering. The majority of the cases cited, with one
or two exceptions, use the old section numbers.
106. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
107. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 539 F.2d 824, 842 (2d Cir.
1976); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 93 (2d Cir.
1975); Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 523 F.2d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1975);
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 492 F.2d 1123, 1135 (5th Cir.
1974); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Andrus, 10 E.R.C. 1353, 1359 (D.D.C. 1977); West
Mich. Environmental Action Council v. Coleman, 10 E.R.C. 1060, 1066 (W.D. Mich.
1977). See also, Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke, 340 F. Supp. 222,
227-28 (M.D.N.C. 1972) (holding that subparagraph 102(2)(C) only requires the agency to
include alternatives in its impact statement and that the more complete analysis required
by subparagraph 102(2)(D) does not have to be included in the impact statement). The
duty to undertake a study of alternatives applies before the time when an impact
statement must be prepared. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 879 n.30 (D.C. Cir.
1975), rev'd on other ground sub nom. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
108. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289,
296 (8th Cir. 1972) (Subparagraph 102(2)(D) "follows and is in addition to the § 102(2)(C)
requirement of a detailed statement discussing. . . alternatives to the proposed action.
This is not to suggest, however, that the more extensive treatment of alternatives
required by § 102(2)(D) cannot be incorporated in the EIS."). An examination of cases in
which discussion of it is challenged reveals that the vast majority were based upon
review of an agency's EIS or negative declaration.
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requirement, however, 109 and should be read as demanding an indepen-
dent consideration of alternatives. The Second Circuit in Trinity Epis-
copal School Corp. v. Romney'10 took this approach, stating: "Federal
agencies must consider alternatives under § 102(2)(D) of NEPA with-
out regard to the filing of an EIS and this obligation is phrased to
encompass a broad type of consideration-'study, develop, and de-
scribe.' ,,I Unlike subparagraphs 102(2)(A) & (B), 102(2)(D) requires
that compliance be evidenced by a writing.1 2
There are two basic issues involved in assessing compliance with
this subparagraph. First, it must be determined which alternatives
must be discussed. Second, it must be determined how thorough the
discussion must be. Although agency compliance with 102(2)(D) is
controlled by the rule of reason," 3 it is of little value to merely state
that reasonable consideration of reasonable alternatives is required in
that courts have produced varying interpretations of reasonableness.
The starting point for many courts is the CEQ Guidelines detailing
the consideration that must be given alternatives in the EIS.
A rigorous exploration and objective evaluation of the environ-
mental impacts of all reasonable alternative actions, particularly
those that might enhance environmental quality or avoid some or
all of the adverse environmental effects, is essential. Sufficient
analysis of such alternatives and their environmental benefits,
costs and risks should accompany the proposed action through the
109. See note 107 supra. Independence is also implicit from two other sets of cases.
The first set of cases imposes a duty of continuing study and review of alternatives on
the agency even after the EIS for the project in question has been prepared. See note 155
infra and cases cited therein. Such a result could not occur if the study of alternatives
were inextricably tied to impact statements. The second set of cases are those requiring a
complete discussion of alternatives even though the agency had filed a negative declara-
tion that their action would have no significant impact. See, e.g., Hanly v. Kleindienst,
471 F.2d 823, 834-36 (2d Cir. 1972); Simmans v. Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5, 17-18 (S.D. Tex.
1974); City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
110. 523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1975).
11. Id. at 93. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 492 F.2d
1123, 1135 (4th Cir. 1974).
112. Subparagraph 102(2)(D) demands that the agency "describe" alternatives.
113. Subparagraph 102(2)(D) only requires that "appropriate alternatives" be de-
scribed. In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th
Cir. 1974), the Fifth Circuit found that all appropriate alternatives had been considered.
Id. at 1135. Thus, "appropriate" can be used to limit the variety of alternatives that must
be discussed. More generally, however, the subparagraph is subject to the rule of
reason, adopted by the courts for all of the subparagraphs of section 102(2). See, e.g.,
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 492 F.2d 1123, 1131 (5th Cir.
1974); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 834 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
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agency review process in order not to foreclose prematurely op-
tions which might enhance environmental quality or have less
detrimental effects. . . . In each case, the analysis should be
sufficiently detailed to reveal the agency's comparative evaluation
of the environmental benefits, costs and risks of the proposed
action and each reasonable alternative .... 114
A similar idea was stated in Calvert Cliffs which interpreted the sub-
paragraph to require that an agency consider "all possible approaches
to a particular project (including total abandonment of the project)
which would alter the environmental impact and the cost-benefit bal-
ance. '" 5 This interpretation accords with the general policy of NEPA
that the agency must consider the environmental impacts of a project
before it adopts a course of action.1 6 Ideally, an agency will not have a
particular course of action in mind when it begins its preliminary
studies. It would then examine the costs, benefits and environmental
impacts of all reasonable means of achieving its primary goal and make
the optimally beneficial decision. If the environmental costs are too
great, it would abandon the project altogether. This study of alterna-
tives has been called the "lynchpin" of NEPA's procedural require-
ments."t
7
1. Necessary Alternatives
Generally, the alternatives considered must be far-reaching. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton118 involved the Department
of the Interior's contemplated sale of oil and gas leases on the Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS). 9 In developing alternatives to the lease sale,
the agency considered only those alternatives which it had the authori-
ty to implement. 120 The District of Columbia Circuit rejected this
attempt to limit the agency's duties and held that all reasonably availa-
114. CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.8(a)(4) (1976).
115. 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
116. Senate Report, supra note 2. The Senate Committee emphasized that the action-
forcing provisions were designed to make environmental considerations an integral part
of the agency decision-making process, not an after the fact justification for a decision
already made.
117. Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693, 697-98 (2d
Cir. 1972).
118. 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
119. Id. at 830-31.
120. Id. at 834, 838-39. The only alternatives the agency considered were eliminating
those sales involving the highest environmental risks and withdrawing the sales com-
pletely. Id.
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ble alternatives must be considered even though new legislation or
action by other agencies would be necessary to effectuate them. 121
There is, nevertheless, some argument as to what constitutes a
"reasonably available" alternative. In Morton, the court demanded
inclusion of some remote and speculative alternatives, even though
they might be impractical. 122 Mention of these alternatives was held
necessary since the agency must continue to review and develop possi-
ble alternatives. 123 The court also held that partial solutions to prob-
lems must be included, so long as they might possibly reduce the
environmental harm.124 While one court has held that alternatives
which have been proven unsuccessful or would have "only a token
effect on the over-all situation" need not be considered,125 identifica-
tion of such alternatives assures a fresh look at new problems instead
of reliance on old choices. 126
The burden of proof in showing that an alternative is reasonably
available was discussed in Aeschliman v. NRC.'27 The Commission
determined that it would not consider energy conservation as an alter-
native to construction of a nuclear power facility because plaintiffs
"had introduced no evidence demonstrating the feasibility of particu-
lar methods of energy conservation, much less evidence indicating that
the proposed facility could be eliminated entirely."' 128 The District of
Columbia Circuit rejected imposition of such a strict burden 29 on
persons proposing alternatives and stated that:
121. Id. at 834, 837.
122. Id. at 837-38. The court considered an alternative remote and speculative if it
would require changes in the statutory authorization or policies of other agencies and
those changes could not be effectuated before the primary agency needed to act. Id.
123. Id. at 836-37. Continuing review is necessary in case the alternative becomes
available to reduce or eliminate adverse impacts with respect to the present project. The
court also recognized that the time for development of the alternative is when the
usefulness of the alternative becomes apparent since "their environmental conse-
quences may be more germane to subsequent proposals for OCS leases, in light of
changes in technology or in variables of energy requirements and supply." Id. at 837.
124. Id. at 836. The court held that the agency cannot "disregard alternatives merely
because they do not offer a complete solution to the problem." Id.
125. Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 471 (9th Cir. 1973).
126. The D.C. Circuit, in Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
granted, 97 S.Ct. 1098 (1977) stated colorable alternatives must still be mentioned even
though redundant or impractical, or for which no meaningful information is presently
available. Id. at 628-29.
127. 547 F.2d 622 (1976).
128. Id. at 627.
129. Id. at 629-30.
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• . . an intervenor's comments on a draft EIS raising a colorable
alternative not presently considered therein must only bring 'suffi-
cient attention to the issue to stimulate the Commission's con-
sideration of it.' Thereafter, it is incumbent on the Commission to
undertake its own preliminary investigation of the proffered alter-
native sufficient to reach a rational judgment whether it is worthy
of detailed consideration in the EIS. Moreover, the Commission
must explain the basis for each conclusion that further con-
sideration of a suggested alternative is unwarranted. 30
"Colorable alternatives" are "those reasonably calculated to reduce
environmental harm while at the same time achieving major portions of
the goals sought to be accomplished by the proposed action."' 31
Challengers may not always be required to suggest colorable alterna-
tives in order to voice a valid claim. In Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. NRC, 32 the District of Columbia Circuit recognized
that lack of objectivity in discussing alternatives may be a violation. 33
In addition the court stated that "where apparently significant infor-
mation has been brought to [the agency's] attention, or substantial
issues of policy or gaps in its reasoning raised, the statement. . . must
indicate why the agency decided the criticisms were invalid. '131 The
130. Id. at 628. Energy conservation was considered a colorable alternative because
the FPC had required its consideration in the past and experts agreed that it would "have
an important . . . role in overall energy policy in the coming decades." Id. at 629.
131. Alabama v. Corps of Eng'rs, 411 F. Supp. 1261, 1274 (D. Ala. 1976). See Sierra
Club v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 830-38 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F.2d
622, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (referred to colorable alternatives as those "relevant to the
goals of the project").
Compare Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1973). In Life of the
Land the Ninth Circuit reviewed alternatives proposed for eliminating noise pollution
from an airport in Hawaii. The court rejected those alternatives proposed by plaintiffs
because they would not alleviate the noise problem, had proved unsuccessful at other
airports, and would have "only token effect on the overall situation." Id. at 470-73.
132. 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
133. The court stated that "where only one side of a controversial issue is developed
in any detail, the agency may abuse its discretion by deciding the issue on an inadequate
record." Id. at 645-46.
A similar claim was made in Citizens Against Destruction of NAPA v. Lynn, 391 F.
Supp. 1188 (N.D. Cal. 1975), in which plaintiffs claimed that alternatives were not
considered because the EIS unequivocally supported HUD. Id. at 1195. The district
court held, however, that plaintiffs hadn't met their burden of proof. Id. at 1196.
Likewise, discussion of only a very limited number of alternatives violates the duty to
develop alternatives. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Morton, 393 F. Supp. 1286 (D.D.C.
1975) (court believed that other reasonable alternatives probably existed).
134. 547 F.2d at 646. The court believed that an agency abuses its discretion if it
cannot point to "particulars in the record which, when coupled with its reservoir of
expertise, supports its resolution of the controversy." Id.
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court believed this heavy burden on the agency is required by NEPA in
order to overcome the inevitable "institutional bias within an agency
proposing a project.' ' 35
In sum, agencies should be aware of alternatives that are reasonably
available. Where comments are solicited from the public, as a practical
matter, persons adversely affected by the project are likely to provide
whatever imagination the agency lacks. The major concern, therefore,
is not whether the agency included sufficient alternatives, but whether
the agency discussion of those alternatives contains sufficient detail to
fulfill the purpose underlying the subparagraph 102(2)(D) requirement.
2. Detailed Study of Alternatives
The purpose underlying the requirement that an agency study, devel-
op and describe all reasonably available alternatives is to ensure that
the decision-maker has sufficient data to make a reasoned choice
between alternatives. 136 A description of alternatives prepared for the
decision-maker prior to adopting a proposal should contain equal con-
sideration of all possible approaches to the problem. 137 In considering
how detailed the study of alternatives must be under section 102(D),
courts will probably look to principles delineated in cases dealing with
the scope of alternatives under section 102(C)'s EIS mandate. Few
courts demand that an objective position be maintained by the agency
in preparing all writings for consideration by the decision-maker. Vio-
lations have been found, however, if the "EIS usurps the Secretary's
decision-making role by framing its discussion of alternatives so that,
based on the EIS alone, only one decision is possible.' ' 38 Courts have
been satisfied with the consideration given to alternatives so long as
each is "presented as thoroughly as the one proposed by the agency,
each given the same weight so as to allow a reasonable reviewer a fair
opportunity to choose between the alternatives. ' 139 Since an EIS ac-
companies a proposal, any analysis of alternatives in an EIS necessari-
135. Id.
136. Robinson v. Knebel, 10 E.R.C. 1097, 1099 (8th Cir. 1977); Iowa Citizens for
Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe, 487 F.2d 849, 852 (8th Cir. 1973); Sierra Club v.
Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm'n v.
AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
137. Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 646 (D.C. Cir.
1976); Texas Comm. on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 10 E.R.C. 1326, 1337 (E.D. Tex.
1977); Rankin v. Coleman, 394 F. Supp. 647, 659 (E.D.N.C. 1975).
138. 1-291 Why? Ass'n v. Bums, 372 F. Supp. 223, 252-53 (D. Conn. 1974). See
Rankin v. Coleman, 394 F. Supp. 647, 659 (E.D.N.C. 1975).
139. Rankin v. Coleman, 394 F. Supp. 647, 659 (E.D.N.C. 1975).
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ly emphasizes the agency's choice.14° Most courts, however, accept
the EIS discussion of alternatives in satisfaction of subparagraph
102(2)(D) if the statement includes "the results of the [agency's] own
investigation and evaluation of alternatives so that the reasons for the
choice of a course of action are clear."'141 In no event may the discus-
sion be conclusory or uninformative-the agency must indicate the
basis for its assertions., 42
Complete information concerning alternatives is not necessary since
this requirerhent is limited by the rule of reason. Detailed discussion is
unnecessary if the environmental effects of an alternative cannot be
reasonably ascertained or if implementation of the alternative is too
remote and speculative. 43 The agency "need collect only as much data
as will be necessary for the [agency] to determine that the alternative is
either infeasible or warrants further attention. . . .If such a determi-
nation is made in good faith and without bias, then the collection of
voluminous amounts of data is unnecessary."44 If all available alterna-
tives have similar impacts then detailed discussion of each is not
required.
145
140. See NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
141. Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346,350 (8th Cir. 1972). See,
e.g., Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289, 1295 (8th Cir. 1976); Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Inman Park Restoration
v. Urban Mass Transp. Admin., 414 F. Supp. 99, 114 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Chelsea Neighbor
Ass'n v. United States Postal Serv., 389 F. Supp. 1171, 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); City of
North Miami v. Train, 377 F. Supp. 1264, 1271 (D.C. Fla. 1974).
142. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 646 (8th
Cir. 1976); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 92 (2d Cir.
1975); Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1287 (1st Cir. 1973); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130,
1139 (4th Cir. 1971); Rankin v. Coleman, 394 F. Supp. 647, 658-59 (E.D.N.C. 1975);
Chelsea Neighbor Ass'n v. United States Postal Serv., 389 F. Supp. 1171, 1184-85
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Nelson v. Butz, 377 F. Supp. 819, 822-23 (D. Minn. 1974); 1-291 Why?
Ass'n v. Bums, 372 F. Supp. 223, 249 (D. Conn. 1974); City of New York v. United
States, 337 F. Supp. 150, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
143. See notes 122-26 and accompanying text supra.
144. Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404,421-22 (W.D. Va.), aff'd, 484
F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1973). For example, in City of North Miami v. Train, 377 F. Supp. 1264
(D.C. Fla. 1974), plaintiffs challenged the selection by EPA of ocean disposal for
municipal waste for failing to adequately discuss a land disposal alternative. Id. at 1269.
The district court held that "the EPA was entitled to reject land application on the basis
of the overriding environmental factors noted above without performing detailed on-site
surveys." Id. This position is just the sort of analysis intended by Congress in enacting
subparagraphs 102(2)(A) & (B). See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449
F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (interpreting the statute to require that the agency
consider abandonment of the project if the environmental costs far outweigh the poten-
tial economic or technical benefits).
145. Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe, 487 F.2d 849, 853 (8th
Cir. 1973). In Iowa Citizens an interstate highway section was complete except for one
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A heavy burden is imposed on plaintiffs challenging the adequacy of
detail and discussion given to alternatives. In Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 46 the Corps' EIS for the Tennessee-
Tombigbee Waterway was challenged for failing to develop the alter-
native of rail transportation. 147 The Fifth Circuit stated that unless
plaintiffs could demonstrate that railways could displace water car-
riage, the "appropriateness of such a transportation scheme . . . re-
mains technically, economically, and ecologically speculative. 148 The
court thus refused to disturb the finding that alternatives had been duly
considered.14 9 Similarly, in North Carolina v. FPC,150 the District of
Columbia Circuit held that the Commission's consideration of "energy
conservation" as an alternative to a power project was sufficient,
based upon a statement in the EIS that demand for electricity would
continue to rise despite "stringent conservation practices.' 151 The
court justified this decision because the "parties raised only the most
generalized concern about 'conservation of energy' in their petitions
for rehearing and never specifically brought such matters as 'peak load
pricing' to the Commission's attention. 152 In Aeschliman,153 the
same court read their opinion in North Carolina v. FPC to say that "if
energy conservation generally were already being considered in an
EIS, . . . [then challenges must] focus the Commission's attention on
specific techniques.'1 4 An agency's discussion of alternatives in an
EIS can be challenged, therefore, only if plaintiffs investigate the
alternatives and produce convincing evidence that the costs or benefits
attributed to the alternative were incorrect or that technical feasibility
was greater than assumed by the agency.
short segment. Detailed discussion was unnecessary since the only real question was
what farmland would be used.
146. 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974).
147. Id. at 1135.
148. Id. at 1136.
149. Id. at 1135.
150. 533 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
151. rd. at 707. The impact on energy conservation was also discussed in the Com-
missioner's opinion denying a rehearing.
152. Id.
153. 547 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977).
154. Id. at 629.
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3. Continuing Review
If discussion of alternatives is limited to that included in the EIS,
then the discussion of alternatives is limited to what can be developed
and described by the time the EIS is filed. It is possible, however, to
interpret 102(2)(D) to impose a continuing requirement to review alter-
natives. 55 Under such an interpretation the agency must develop a
meaningful analysis whenever the necessary data becomes reasonably
ascertainable. This forces full development of alternatives at the ear-
liest possible time. Analysis of politically speculative alternatives al-
lows Congress to assess their possible benefits. Presently unascertain-
able environmental consequences may be revealed through subsequent
studies, and thus a detailed comparison of all relevant alternatives may
eventually be made. Expanded use of this concept would substantially
increase the usefulness of subparagraph 102(2)(D) in insuring that the
optimal course of action is adopted by the sponsoring agency.
D. Subparagraph 102(2)(G)--Initiating and
Utilizing Ecological Information
Subparagraph 102(2)(G) provides:
(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall-(G) initiate and utilize ecological information in the ,an-
ning and development of resource-oriented projects.
This subparagraph has undergone little development by the courts.
One early interpretation held that the subparagraph provides authority
for agencies to undertake research in areas not traditionally within the
scope of their jurisdiction.1 57 This promotes one purpose of NEPA,
which is to authorize agency consideration of environmental factors
where such authorization had previously been considered absent. 58
155. The following cases support the proposition that continuing review of possible
alternatives is mandatory-Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d
289, 297 (8th Cir. 1972); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827,
836 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Inman Park Restoration v. Urban Mass Transp. Admin., 414 F.
Supp. 99, 115 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Save the Courthouse Comm. v. Lynn, 408 F. Supp.
1323, 1342 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1345 (S.D. Tex.
1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 348 F. Supp. 916, 940 (N.D.
Miss. 1972).
156. NEPA § 102(2)(G), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(H) (1970), as amended by, Act of Aug. 9,
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-83.
157. Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401, 1404 (D.D.C. 1971).
158. CONF. REP. oN S. 1075, H.R. REP. No. 91-765, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. 4 (1969); see
NEPA § 103, 42 U.S.C. § 4333 (1970).
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Only one reported case has found an agency in violation of sub-
paragraph 102(2)(G). National Helium Corp. v. Morton'59 involved a
review of the Secretary of the Interior's action in canceling helium
conservation contracts."6 The court held that the Interior Depart-
ment's failure to participate in a study sponsored by the National
Science Foundation on helium needs and reserves violated the agen-
cy's duties under subparagraph 102(2)(G).' 6' The court rejected the
agency's defense that the studies were not brought to the agency's
attention and that participation would have "jeopardized their status in
pending litigation.' ' 62
It should be clear that an agency cannot be content to rely on
existing sources of ecological information, nor on ongoing studies
initiated by others. 61 If adequate information is not available, then the
agency must initiate the studies itself. Thus the most important effect
of this subparagraph is that it qualifies what constitutes reasonable
efforts by an agency under subparagraphs 102(2)(B) and (D). An agen-
cy should not be able to avoid discussion of either the environmental
effects of an action or available alternatives on the grounds that infor-
mation is not presently ascertainable. The agency must initiate studies
to try to develop the information before it can legitimately claim that
all facts and relevant data have been considered.'( 4
III. CONCLUSION-NECESSITY FOR A BALANCED USE OF SECTION
102(2) ACTION-FORCING PROVISIONS
There are numerous advantages to utilizing the neglected subparag-
raphs of section 102(2). First, the "major Federal action" limitation on
subparagraph 102(2)(C) does not limit the application of subparagraphs
159. 361 F. Supp. 78 (D. Kan. 1973).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 106.
162. Id.
163. Subparagraph 102(2)(G) specifically directs that the agency shall initiate ecolog-
ical information. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(H) (1970), as amended by Act of Aug. 9, 1975, Pub.
L. No. 94-83.
164. For example, in Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the D.C.
Circuit held that the Commission could not reject a colorable alternative out-of-hand
without first initiating preliminary studies designed to assess the feasibility of the
alternative. Id. at 630. If the agency then determined that the alternative was technically
and economically feasible and could be used to mitigate the environmental impact of
other proposed methods of achieving the agency's primary goals, then the agency would
have to give the alternative the complete discussion mandated by subparagraphs
102(2)(C)(iii), (D).
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102(2)(A), (B), (D), & (G). Subparagraph 102(2)(A), for example, is
triggered whenever an action "may" have an environmental impact. 1
65
Failure to comply with any of these provisions will be cause for an
enforcement action. This assures adequate protection of environmen-
tal values regardless of a present supposition that no significant en-
vironmental harm will occur and that a complete EIS should be ex-
cused. For whatever reasons a court determines that an EIS will be
unnecessary, it will seldom justify non-compliance with subparagraphs
102(2)(A), (B), (D) & (G).
Even if an EIS is prepared, these subparagraphs impose a continu-
ing responsibility to review the developing knowledge about environ-
mental consequences of particular actions and adjust all existing pro-
jects "to the fullest extent possible" to minimize adverse environmen-
tal effects. In addition, the Supreme Court limitation in Kleppe v.
Sierra Club'66 is based solely upon language in subparagraph 102(2)(C)
and thus imposes no limitation on the early applicability of the remain-
ing subparagraphs. 167
Cases holding that there is a clear and fundamental conflict between
an agency's primary mission and the delay caused by NEPA were
based on the delay inherent in preparing an impact statement.'6 Such
delay is not present when complying with the remaining subparagraphs
of section 102(2) because an agency may tentatively make a decision
on a project, subject to modification once complete information on the
environmental consequences is developed.
Whenever agencies are excused from preparation of an EIS, adverse
environmental consequences will not be eliminated or even mitigated,
the magnitude or extent of the impact will not be revealed to the public
in general, unknown impacts will remain undiscovered and little useful
knowledge will be made available for use by other agencies in dis-
covering or evaluating man's impact on the environment. Whenever
EIS preparation or judicial review of agency compliance is postponed,
development of environmental information at the point in time when it
may affect the agencies' decision or subjective commitment to a pro-
ject cannot be insured nor can adverse impacts of the interim action be
mitigated. Once an EIS has been filed and accepted, subparagraph
165. See NEPA § 102(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A) (1970).
166. 427 U.S. 390 (1976). See notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra.
167. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 405-06 (1976).
168. See notes 29-34 and accompanying text supra.
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102(2)(C) imposed no additional environmental duties on an agency
unless an alteration in the plan constitutes a new major federal action.
Thus no new information or technology must be considered by the
agency even if it may still be incorporated into their decision. The
procedures prescribed by these other subparagraphs are practical pro-
cedures designed to eliminate these weaknesses and should, them-
selves, be utilized "to the fullest extent possible" to challenge agency
actions.
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